Marine Corps is retiring CH-46

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CH-46 Sea Knight helicopter will no longer be utilized by the Marine Corps

Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton — As time goes by, rules, ideas and even traditions are subject to change at any given moment. The Marine Corps, over the years, has gone through many changes to either enhance fighting capabilities or to evolve as a rapid reaction military force.

On Feb 20, 2013, Eight Marines with Medium Helicopter Training Squadron received their wings and became aircrew chiefs. Unfortunately with this momentous occasion, came the realization that the CH-46 Sea Knight that these new chiefs trained on will no longer be utilized by the Marine Corps.

Goodbye CH-46

Goodbye CH-46

“We are here to recognize these eight Marines as the last aircrew chiefs to graduate using the CH-46,” said Maj Gen. Steve Busby, the commanding general of 3rd Marine Air Wing. “These Marines are now responsible for continuing the legacy of this aircraft and are now forever a part of history.”

The mission of the CH-46 is to provide helicopter transport of personnel, supplies and equipment for the landing force. Its primary task is to transport Marine Corps troops to designated areas and since 1964, Marines have ensured that the CH-46′s primary mission was upheld.

The end of the CH-46 era

It’s now the end of the CH-46 era and its passing affects many different parties. Busby, an Akron, Oh., native, has had a lot of experiences with the CH-46.

“I’ve had a lot of memories with this helicopter,” said Busby. “I’ve been on two deployments with this helicopter and during the tsunami effort, I was on this thing almost every day witnessing the destruction the tsunami had caused.”

Marines were not the only ones who were impacted by this event. Melei Nguyen Kelly and her mother Thai Nguyen are some of the many people who this helicopter has affected by accomplishing its primary mission.

“It’s very sad to see them go,” said Kelly. “It reminds us of when we first came to this country on them. The man taking me said to look down from the helicopter and he said that it will be the last time I see my country.”

A 12-year-old Kelly and her mother were transported from Vietnam to the United States on April 27, 1975 on CH-46s to escape, what was then, a hostile environment during the Vietnam War.
The CH-46 Sea Knight will be replaced by the MV-22 Osprey in the near future. Although the CH-46 will not be utilized, Marines who have operated it and others who have been helped by it will forever remember what the CH-46 has done for them.

CH-46 TO MV-22B TRANSITION/CONVERSION

(T/C) Date Signed: 5/29/2012 MARADMINS Active Number: 287/12 R 291407Z MAY 12 UNCLASSIFIED// MARADMIN 287/12 MSGID/GENADMIN,USMTF,2007/CMC WASHINGTON DC AVN ASM//

SUBJ/CH-46 TO MV-22B TRANSITION/CONVERSION (T/C)//

REF/A/MSGID:DOC/MCO P1300.8R/-// REF/B/MSGID:DOC/MCO 1331.2K/-// REF/C/MSGID:MARADMIN/454.06/-// REF/D/MSGID:MARADMIN/302.08/-// REF/E/MSGID:MARADMIN/593.11/-// REF/F/MSGID:MARADMIN/251.12/-// NARR/ REF A IS THE MARINE CORPS PERSONNEL ASSIGNMENT POLICY.

REF B IS MARINE CORPS ORDER FOR TRANSITION/CONVERSION (T/C) TRAINING FOR MARINE NAVAL AVIATORS AND NAVAL FLIGHT OFFICERS. REF C IS THE MV-22 TRANSITION POLICY WHICH SHIFTED THE SELECTION PROCESS TO A DIRECT ASSIGNMENT PROCESS. REF D IS THE MV-22 MANPOWER PROCESS AND TRANSITION CONSTRUCT AND REF E IS THE CY-12 CH-46 TO MV-22 TRANSITION BOARD MESSAGE WHICH RE-INSTATED THE HQMC TRANSITION BOARD SELECTION PROCESS. REF F IS THE FY-13 TRANSITION CONVERSION BOARD NOTIFICATION MESSAGE.// POC/LAVATO, A. D./MAJ, ASM-31/UNIT:HQMC AVN ASM/-/TEL:703-693-9874 /EMAIL:ANDREAS.LAVATO@USMC.MIL// GENTEXT/REMARKS/1. THIS MESSAGE DEFINES REMAINING T/C CAREER PATH OPPORTUNITIES AVAILABLE TO THE 7562 POPULATION FOR TRANSITION TO THE MV-22. THE CH-46 SUNDOWN IS TIED DIRECTLY TO THE MV-22 TRANSITION TIMELINE. AS SUCH, CH-46 PILOTS REMAIN THE PRIMARY SOURCE FOR FILLING MV-22 PILOT TRANSITION REQUIREMENTS. THE CY-12 TRANSITION BOARD SELECTED 29 7562 OFFICERS FOR TRANSITION TO THE MV-22. THERE ARE 55 ACTIVE DUTY MV-22 TRANSITION ALLOCATIONS REMAINING BETWEEN FY-13 AND FY-16. REF B IDENTIFIES CAREER ALTERNATIVES FOR THOSE WHO ARE NOT SELECTED FOR T/C TRAINING. 2. COMMAND SELECTED: CONUS BASED HMM TRANSITIONING SQUADRON COMMANDERS WILL BE ALLOCATED A MAXIMUM OF EIGHT TRANSITION QUOTAS. GRADE SHAPING CONSTRAINTS WILL BE PROVIDED DIRECTLY TO SQUADRON COMMANDING OFFICERS VIA SEPARATE CORRESPONDENCE. THE SELECTED OFFICERS WILL BE COMMITTED TO A 4 YEAR CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION FOLLOWING THE COMPLETION OF MV-22 TRAINING IAW REF B. THE COMMANDING OFFICER’S SELECTED NAMES SHALL BE SUBMITTED VIA THE ENDORSING CHAIN OF COMMAND TO HQMC AVN (ASM-31) NLT 9 MONTHS PRIOR TO TRANSITION FOR HMMT-164, HMM-364, AND HMM-268. NOMINATIONS ENDORSED BY THE WING DO NOT REQUIRE FURTHER ENDORSEMENTS BEFORE ROUTING TO HQMC AVN (ASM-31). 3. T/C BOARDS: MMOA-2 NO LONGER DIRECTLY ASSIGNS CH-46E PILOTS TO MV-22 TRANSITION TRAINING. CONTACTING MMOA DOES NOT CONSTITUTE APPLICATION FOR TRANSITION. ALL BOARD APPLICANTS SHALL SUBMIT AN AA FORM IAW REF B AND F. THE REMAINING T/C BOARDS WILL SELECT THE MOST COMPETITIVE PACKAGES FOR TRANSITION. THE AUG 2012 T/C BOARD ALLOTMENT HAS BEEN INCREASED TO (16) OFFICERS TO TRANSITION TO THE MV-22; THE SUMMER 2013 ALLOTMENT IS (8) AND SUMMER 2014 ALLOTMENT IS (7). IAW REF F, HMM, MAG, HMX-1 AND MATSG COMMANDING OFFICER’S ARE TO PRIORITIZE THEIR 7562 BOARD APPLICANTS. IN ADDITION TO A LINEAL RANKING, AMPLIFYING INFORMATION PROVIDED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE BOARD BY COMMANDING OFFICERS IS A MATTER OF RECORD AND WILL BE TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION. 4. OBLIGATED SERVICE. THIS REVISED POLICY SHIFTS FROM A DIRECT ASSIGNMENT PROCESS TO A HQMC AVN BOARD. AVIATORS SELECTED TO VOLUNTARILY COMPLETE TRANSITION TRAINING BY A T/C BOARD, OR COMMANDING OFFICER, ARE UNDER CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION FOR FOUR YEARS. THIS OBLIGATION COMMENCES ON THE DATE TRANSITION TRAINING IS COMPLETED. OBLIGATED SERVICE FOR MONITOR SELECTED DIRECT INVOLUNTARY TRANSITION MARINES, OR THOSE WITH ORDERS STATING ‘INVOLUNTARY’, WILL BE HANDLED ON A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS IAW REF B. 5. THIS MESSAGE IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THE MARINE CORPS RESERVE. 6. RELEASE AUTHORIZED BY LTGEN T. G. ROBLING, DEPUTY COMMANDANT FOR AVIATION.//

 

Replacing The Aging CH-46

CSC 1993
SUBJECT AREA – Aviation
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Title:   Replacing the Aging CH-46
Author:  Major Gary L. Willison, United States Marine Corps
Thesis:  The Marine Corps currently recognizes that CH-46
helicopters are no longer capable of conducting the medium lift
mission.  The Marine Corps must replace these helicopters with a
fleet of aircraft capable of conducting the mission for the next
25 years.
Background:  Marine CH-46 helicopters are now technically
obsolete and are rapidly approaching the end of service life.
Outdated systems and growing maintenance concerns emphasize the
need to replace these helicopters with aircraft capable of
performing medium lift missions well into the 21st century.
Inadequate payload, insufficient fuel endurance, and primitive
navigation and communication systems limit the aircraft’s
capabilities.  The cockpit lighting system is incompatible with
night vision goggles.  To correct the medium lift problem the
Marine Corps is exploring two replacement alternatives for the
aircraft.  The primary alternative is the MV-22 Osprey, a tilt-
rotor aircraft.  The second alternative is the purchase of
existing or new helicopter technology.  Acquisition of the MV-22
instead of a helicopter alternative is more expensive, causing a
debate over which aircraft to purchase.  The MV-22 satisfies the
forecasted needs and requirements of the Marine Corps for the
next 25 years.  The less expensive helicopter options do not meet
the range and airspeed requirements of the future.  Acquisition
of a helicopter replacement for the CH-46 will only be an interim
solution to the medium lift problem.
Recommendation:  The Marine Corps should replace the aging CH-46
helicopters with a fleet of MV-22 Osprey aircraft.
REPLACING THE AGING CH-46
OUTLINE
Thesis:  The Marine Corps currently recognizes that CH-46
helicopters are no longer capable of conducting the medium lift
mission.  The Marine Corps must replace these helicopters with a
fleet of aircraft capable of conducting the mission for the next
25 years.
I.   Problems with the CH-46
A.    Inadequate payload
B.    Insufficient fuel endurance
C.    Outdated aircraft lighting systems
D.    Primitive navigation and communication systems
E.    Increasing maintenance requirements
II.  CH-46 Replacement Options
A.    Upgrade existing helicopter technology
B.    MV-22 Osprey
III. Proposed helicopter options
A.    Alternative aircraft
B.    New helicopter development
IV.  Debate over cost
A.    MV-22 vs. helicopter alternatives
B.    MV-22 performance and cost reduction studies
V.   Real-world scenario
A.    Eastern Exit (NEO in Mogadishu, Somalia)
B.    MV-22 and Eastern Exit
REPLACING THE AGING CH-46
The Marine Corps has used CH-46 Sea Knight helicopters
for medium assault support missions since the early 1960′s.
Over the years these versatile transport helicopters have
been used in Vietnam, Beirut, Grenada, the Gulf War, and
most recently, Somalia.  CH-46′s have been used in every
humanitarian relief and noncombatant evacuation mission
involving Marine Expeditionary Units in the last three
decades.  In the future, roles and missions assigned by the
Warfighting CINCs will inevitably require the continued use
of medium lift helicopters.
Unfortunately, Marine CH-46 helicopters are now
technically obsolete and are rapidly approaching the end of
service life.  Outdated systems and growing maintenance
concerns emphasize the need to replace these helicopters
with aircraft capable of performing medium lift missions
well into the 21st century.  The Marine Corps currently
recognizes that CH-46 helicopters are no longer capable of
conducting the medium lift mission.  The Marine Corps must
replace these helicopters with a fleet of aircraft capable
of conducting the mission for the next 25 years.
PROBLEMS WITH THE CH-46
Many problems with the CH-46 contribute to the
aircraft’s obsolescence.  A major problem with the CH-46
aircraft is the inadequate payload.  The CH-46 was designed
to accommodate a total gross weight of 24,300 pounds.
Recent weight restrictions due to stress on the aircraft’s
dynamic components have reduced the helicopter’s maximum
gross weight to 22,000 pounds.  The weight restrictions
apply to internal and external cargo alike.  The resulting
payload reduction means that instead of carrying 24 combat
loaded troops the aircraft now carries a maximum of 12.
Insufficient fuel endurance is another problem with the
CH-46.  The aircraft has to refuel every 90 to 100 minutes.
In a shipboard environment, while conducting an over-the-
horizon heliborne assault, CH-46′s have to refuel every time
they return to the ship.  This causes a delay in the rapid
buildup of combat power ashore, particularly at night or in
adverse weather.  Internal cells or expanded stub-wing fuel
tanks adding 60 to 90 minutes of endurance are often used,
but the additional fuel significantly reduces available
payload.
The standard CH-46 cockpit lighting system is not
compatible with night vision goggles.  Before flight
operations requiring goggles, a blue light kit suitable for
night vision devices must be installed over the cockpit
instruments.  Installation of the kit is inconvenient and
time-consuming.  Pilots have difficulty reading the cockpit
instrumentation because the kit does not adequately
illuminate all the instruments.  Most pilots must rely on
tiny lights known as lip-lights mounted on their helmets to
help them see the cockpit gauges.
The searchlight on the CH-46 requires an infrared lens
to make the light compatible with night vision goggles.
This lens is mounted by squadron avionics personnel when the
cockpit blue light kit is installed.  After installation, if
pilots must fly without goggles, the searchlight is not
visible to the naked eye.  This situation is a potential
flight hazard, particularly when landing at an unlit field
or zone.  The CH-46 is not equipped with a dual searchlight
system that would enable the pilot a choice while airborne.
The pilot is limited to the searchlight configuration
existing on the aircraft prior to launch.
Navigation and communication systems on the CH-46 are
primitive and unreliable.  The Automatic Direction Finding
(ADF) equipment is outdated and inaccurate.  The TACAN
system is only accurate to one half nautical mile because
the Distance Measuring Equipment (DME) is not digital.
Modifications have been made in recent years to add LORAN
and Global Positioning Systems (GPS) to the aircraft.  Since
the aircraft was not originally designed with these
navigational devices, they are mounted in awkward positions
in the cockpit.  The inconvenient locations increase pilot
workload.  The CH-46 lacks essential state-of-the-art
navigation equipment necessary for adverse weather
conditions and demanding night operations.
Maintenance of the CH-46 has become a monumental
problem with the aircraft.  It is increasingly difficult to
get replacement parts.  Maintenance man-hours per flight-
hour have gone from 17 to 40.  Nondestructive Inspections
(NDI) are necessary after every 10 hours of flight.  This
time-consuming task requires skilled technicians to inspect
each rotorhead for cracks.  Undetected cracks in the
rotorheads could lead to catastrophic failure.  The CH-46 is
no longer cost-effective to operate.
Marine Expeditionary Units (Special Operations Capable)
are currently deployed around the world ready to respond to
any crisis in support of the Warfighting CINCs.  CH-46
helicopters are deployed as integral parts of these units.
These aircraft will participate in any contingencies that
may occur.  The technical obsolescence of the CH-46,
however, reduces its capability to support assigned
missions.  The missions often require flight operations in
poor weather or at night.  The missions require pilots to
navigate over greater and greater distances in unfamiliar
areas of the world.  Expectations of mission success are
high.
With the New World Order comes a renewed focus on the
littorals.  The recent deployment of forces to Somalia
reinforces this “from the sea” concept.  CH-46 squadrons
continue to provide support, even though the helicopters are
no longer capable of performing the medium lift mission.
The weight restrictions placed on the aircraft coupled with
poor fuel endurance make them little better than utility
helicopters.  In an expeditionary situation such as Somalia,
operations employing CH-46 support will require many forward
refueling points.
Clearly, the Marine Corps lacks a medium lift assault
support aircraft that can conduct assigned missions into the
21st century.  The Ch-46 cannot adequately support over-the-
horizon missions at night or in adverse weather.  The CH-46
is not reliable from a maintenance perspective.  It is not
equipped with the latest technologies in communications and
navigation equipment.  The CH-46 is not fully compatible
with night vision goggles.  It is not equipped with a dual
searchlight that is functional with or without goggles.  The
aircraft does not have enough fuel endurance and can only
transport 12 combat loaded Marines.  CH-46 Sea Knight
helicopters are no longer capable of conducting the medium
lift mission.
CH-46 REPLACEMENT OPTIONS
Recognizing this need to replace the fleet of aging CH-
46 helicopters, the Marine Corps plans to correct the medium
lift problem with one of two replacement aircraft
alternatives.  The primary alternative is the MV-22, a tilt-
rotor aircraft.  Marine Corps requirements for this aircraft
are in the Joint Services Operational Requirement for the
Advanced Vertical Lift Aircraft (JVX JSOR) of April 1985.
(6)  The second alternative is the purchase of existing or
new helicopter technology.  Marine Corps requirements for
this aircraft are in the Revised Operational Requirements
Document for the Medium Lift Replacement Aircraft (MLR ORD)
of May 1992.  (8)  The MLR ORD option was developed after
the cancellation of the JVX program.  Cancellation of the
JVX was due to budgetary constraints.  Acquisition of either
alternative as a replacement for the CH-46 would improve
current Marine Corps capabilities.
A careful analysis of the JVX JSOR and the MLR ORD
reveals an interesting concept.  Procurement of an aircraft
meeting the minimum requirements of the MLR ORD will not
satisfy the requirements of the JVX JSOR.  Conversely,
procurement of an aircraft satisfying the minimum
requirements of the JVX JSOR will exceed the requirements of
the MLR ORD.  The MV-22 Osprey is under development
specifically to satisfy the requirements of the JVX JSOR.
The Osprey will possess the capabilities needed to
accomplish assigned medium lift missions into the early 21st
century.
Many similarities exist between the MLR ORD and the JVX
JSOR.  Both documents show a need for a replacement assault
support aircraft suitable for the conduct of amphibious
operations.  The aircraft must operate in all climates and
will have modern navigation and communications equipment.
The documents require internal and external lighting system
compatibility with state-of-the-art night vision devices and
goggles.  Seating for 24 combat-loaded troops and two
crewmen, a winch system, and an external hoist system are
other characteristics common to both documents.
The MLR ORD and the JVX JSOR each requires that the
replacement aircraft be capable of conducting external lifts
of at least 10,000 pounds.  Additionally, the ability to
refuel from standard in-flight aerial systems and hover in-
flight ship refueling systems is included in both
alternatives.  MLR and JVX requirements include head-up or
helmet-mounted displays of essential tactical, flight, and
systems information.
Differing requirements between the two proposed
alternatives clearly indicate that the MV-22 offers more
capabilities.  For example, the MLR ORD requires the
replacement aircraft to cruise at a minimum airspeed of 180
knots with a desired airspeed of 200 knots.  The JSOR
requires a continuous cruise speed of 250 knots and a dash
speed of 275 knots.  Based upon these figures, it is
possible to achieve a more rapid build-up of combat power
ashore with MV-22 aircraft.  In an over-the-horizon
scenario, this quicker transfer of combat power ashore can
determine the difference between the success or failure of a
mission.
Another difference between the two options is the
requirement for self-deployment.  The MLR ORD requires the
replacement aircraft to have a self-deployment capability
but does not stipulate specific range and time constraints.
The JVX JSOR requires the MV-22 to have worldwide self-
deployment capability with flight legs of at least 2,100
nautical miles.  Although this objective must be
accomplished without refueling, internal or external fuel
tanks may be used to fulfill the requirement.  The aircraft
must have oceanic navigation systems and include provisions
for weather radar.  This ability to rapidly self-deploy on
short notice is a distinct advantage of the MV-22.  When the
Warfighting CINCs are confronted with a crisis response
situation, the capabilities of the MV-22 will offer them an
extremely versatile option.  (5:17)
PROPOSED HELICOPTER OPTIONS
Several helicopter alternatives to fulfill the
requirements of the MLR ORD are being considered by the
Marine Corps.  These aircraft include upgraded versions of
the CH-46, CH-60, CH-53, EH-101, AS-332, CH-47, and a new
production helicopter.  The existing aircraft all require
extensive modifications and upgrades to improve performance
characteristics.  Even with the additional upgrades, these
helicopter candidates do not meet the specified requirements
of the MLR ORD.  The new production helicopter could meet
all requirements of the MLR ORD with exception of the speed
and self-deployment capability.  A new helicopter
incorporating modern technology would take years to develop
and would delay replacement of the CH-46 even further.  (2)
A brief comparison of capabilities between possible
replacement helicopters shows that the EH-101 cruise speed
of 144 knots is the closest to the MLR ORD requirement of
180 knots.  The JSOR requires a cruise speed of 250 knots.
The MLR ORD and JSOR require that the aircraft be capable of
conducting an over-the-horizon assault with 24 troops as
passengers.  Only the CH-53 and CH-47 options fulfill this
requirement.
When comparing each aircraft’s individual capabilities
it is clear that none of the helicopter alternatives meet
the requirements of the MLR ORD.  Furthermore, there is not
a helicopter that exceeds the others in every category.  The
faster aircraft do not offer the best lift capabilities.
Wide differences exist in fuel endurance and range
capabilities.  Although any of the proposed replacement
helicopters would improve Marine Corps medium lift
capabilities, acquisition of such an aircraft would fall
short of specified Marine Corps requirements.  The
replacement helicopter would be nothing more than an interim
purchase.
THE DEBATE OVER ACQUISITION COST
The controversy over which option to follow deals with
acquisition costs.  An aircraft built to meet the
requirements of the JSOR is more expensive than the purchase
of a proposed upgrade of existing helicopter technology.  In
a period of declining defense spending, this issue has
become central to the debate over which aircraft the Marine
Corps should buy to fill the medium lift void.
To save money and still get an aircraft to meet future
operational needs, the Marine Corps is conducting trade-off
studies to determine if money can be saved by “designing
out” features already incorporated in the MV-22 Osprey.
These studies are being conducted to see if reductions in
performance capabilities will translate into unit cost
savings.  The focus of the examination is to determine the
level of mission degradation that will occur when various
reductions in aircraft performance are implemented.  Current
unit cost for the MV-22 Osprey, as designed to meet the
requirements of the JSOR, is $33.4 million.  Implementation
of all performance reductions currently under consideration
would save $6.7 million (in FY92 dollars) per aircraft.  (4)
Structural changes to the MV-22 are the primary
differences being considered in the effort to save money.
The most significant of these changes is the replacement of
the composite airframe for a less expensive metal frame.
Other considerations include less capable avionics packages,
the deletion of the vibration reduction system, and a more
simplified rotor.  Additionally, some of the specialized
gear such as FLIR may be available as kits rather than
installed in the aircraft upon delivery.  (2)
Although the trade-off study results are not scheduled
to be finalized until August 1993, it appears that cost
savings due to performance reductions will ultimately create
greater life-cycle expenses for the MV-22.  For example, a
metal airframe will require extensive corrosion control
maintenance over the life of the aircraft.  The saltwater
environment intrinsic to shipboard operations causes metal
aircraft components to rust very quickly.  The composite
airframe feature of the MV-22 would eliminate this corrosion
problem.  (4)  In addition, elimination of the MV-22′s
vibration reduction system may cause more rapid
deterioration of aircraft components due to the increased
vibration levels.
THE MV-22 AND A REAL-WORLD SCENARIO
Operation Eastern Exit, the January 1991 Noncombatant
Evacuation Operation (NEO) in Mogadishu, Somalia, was a
real-world scenario in which the MV-22 might have been
extremely useful.  The mission, although successful, could
have been accomplished more efficiently with MV-22 aircraft
aboard the USS Guam.  The mission required two CH-53E
aircraft to fly 460 miles over water to Mogadishu to insert
a security force and then return to the USS Trenton.  This
flight required three aerial refuelings for each aircraft.
Communications with the security force in Mogadishu
indicated that evacuation by helicopter was needed due to
the threat.  The USS Guam and USS Trenton continued to steam
at full speed towards the Somalian coast to get close enough
to begin the evacuation of noncombatants from the American
Embassy.  Upon arrival, and under the cover of darkness,
Marines flying CH-46 helicopters conducted the evacuation
with the aid of night vision goggles.
The Marine Corps, in a future Eastern Exit scenario,
will be able to insert the security force with only one
aerial refueling using the MV-22 as the medium lift
platform. During the evacuation operation the mission can be
conducted sooner since there will be no requirement to place
the ships so close to the coast.  Additionally, updated
communications and navigation equipment in the MV-22 will
enhance mission success.  Finally, the MV-22 cockpit will be
compatible with the use of night vision goggles making the
aircraft easier to fly at night.  This advanced equipment
will decrease pilot workload and increase pilot situational
awareness.  Pilots will be able to concentrate more on safe
execution of the mission.  (7:20)
In summary, the Marine Corps needs to replace the aging
CH-46 with an aircraft that will meet the requirements of
the next 25 years.  An aircraft fulfilling the minimum
provisions of the MLR ORD will only be an interim
replacement.  The best alternative for the longer term is
the MV-22 Osprey.  Superior range and airspeed potentials of
the MV-22 over the proposed helicopter alternatives create a
considerable advantage.  These improved capabilities
translate into greater flexibility and swifter response to
unexpected crisis situations.  The MV-22 is the medium lift
aircraft best suited to replace the CH-46.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
1.   Darling, Col. Buck. “Warfighting the V-22.” Amphibious
Warfare Review Spring 89:26-31.
2.   Decisions Options Paper. Aviation Weapons Branch,
Headquarters Marine Corps, Washington, D.C. Feb
93.
3.   Gisold, Maj. Gary. “The V-22 and the Future Threat.”
Amphibious Warfare Review Spring 90:18-22.
4.   Hanifen, Maj. B. T. Telephone Interview. Aviation
Weapons Branch, Headquarters Marine Corps,
Washington, D.C. Feb 93.
5.   Humston, LtCol. Douglas E. “Over the Horizon-2000.”
Amphibious Warfare Review Winter 89:17.
6.   Joint Services Operational Requirement for the Advanced
Vertical Lift Aircraft (JVX JSOR). Department of
Defense April 85.
7.   Lawrence, Col. W. S. “The V-22 Cockpit.” Amphibious
Warfare Review Spring 89:20.
8.   Revised Operational Requirements Document (ORD) for the
Medium Lift Replacement Aircraft (MLR). Quantico,
VA: Marine Corps Combat Development Command, May
92.

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